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NO. 22 MAY 2020 Introduction 
New Political Parties and the Reconfigu-
ration of Turkey’s Political Landscape 
Salim Çevik 
The recent emergence of two splinter parties from the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) points to a deepening crisis within the party and growing discontent toward 
party leader and president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although the leaders of the two 
new parties, Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, are both former high-ranking AKP 
politicians, they differ significantly in their style of politics and ideological leanings. 
Babacan is trying to position himself at the center of Turkey’s ideological spectrum 
and emphasize issues of good governance and the rule of law. Davutoğlu is aiming 
for the more conservative voters, focusing on the moral shortcomings of the current 
regime. Davutoğlu’s strategy has better chances in the short term, whereas Babacan 
is poised for a long game. The importance of both parties relies on their potential to 
attract votes from the AKP base. In a country that is deeply divided into two almost 
equal-sized camps that support Erdoğan and oppose him, even a small fraction of 
votes shifting from the AKP to the opposition can be a game changer. 
 
On March 11, former Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Ali Babacan announced the formation 
of his long-awaited political party. Former 
President Abdullah Gül is known to be sup-
portive of the party, even though he and his 
close associates did not have an official role 
in its formation. The party name, DEVA 
(“remedy”), is also the acronym for the 
Democracy and Progress Party. Earlier last 
December, former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) and later Prime Minister (PM) 
Ahmet Davutoğlu formed his own Future 
Party (GP). Both will compete for the elec-
torate that has been disappointed by the 
AKP – a group that is slowly but steadily 
growing. 
The launching of the new parties fell 
short of expectations in terms of raising 
the public’s interest. Particularly DEVA 
attracted little attention on the day of its 
founding. This was mostly due to public 
fatigue, as its debut had been postponed 
several times last year. Once it was officially 
formed, the party could have generated 
interest, but the coronavirus epidemic 
began dominating the public debate and 
DEVA disappeared from the headlines. 
However, these parties still have more 
potential than other opposition parties 
to attract votes from the AKP base. 
Currently, the political system is domi-
nated by the ruling conservative-nationalist 
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People’s Alliance, comprised of the AKP and 
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and 
the opposing Nation Alliance, composed 
of the secularist Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) and the centrist-nationalist Good 
Party (IP). The Nation Alliance is supported 
by the Islamist Felicity Party (SP) and the 
pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party 
(HDP) on an ad hoc basis. What unites these 
parties is their opposition to Erdoğan and 
the presidential system. The divisions be-
tween the alliances had been so deep that 
swing votes moved within alliances and 
almost never between them. 
There are two reasons why the old 
opposition parties cannot draw more sup-
port from the AKP. First, they do not appear 
to be capable managers. Second, the coun-
try is deeply divided over identity issues, 
most significantly between the secularists 
and the conservatives, and the Turkish 
nationalists and the Kurdish political 
movement. This polarization has enabled 
the AKP to consolidate its votes, despite the 
emerging problems of governance and 
economy. However, the new splinter parties 
now present an option for disillusioned 
AKP supporters. Such voters can oppose 
Erdoğan and defect from the AKP without 
leaving the conservative camp. Given that 
Erdoğan only reaches the required 50 
percent vote threshold in the new system 
when in alliance with the MHP, such a 
defection could be detrimental to his rule. 
Sensing the gravity of the threat, Erdoğan is 
heavily attacking both parties. 
Potential of the New Parties 
In Turkish politics, splinter parties usually 
fail to attract significant numbers of voters. 
Several senior figures from across the politi-
cal spectrum have formed new parties 
with much fanfare, but they have failed to 
attract voters. One exception, however, is 
the AKP, which was formed as a splinter 
party from the Milli Görüs tradition in 2001 
and came to office within a year of its 
founding. Arguably, the circumstances for 
the AKP victory were quite exceptional and 
hard to replicate. The AKP’s success was 
the result of a series of economic and gov-
ernance crises that discredited all the major 
political parties. 
One reason both DEVA and the GP were 
recently formed is due to increased aware-
ness that Turkey is currently going through 
a similar governance problem, with the 
potential to worsen. Amidst a deteriorating 
economic crisis, the Syria foreign policy 
disaster, the huge influx of refugees, and 
heightened social tensions, Erdoğan’s 
approval rates are falling. Moreover, un-
decided voters now constitute one of the 
largest voting blocs. Disagreements of 
Babacan and Davutoğlu with Erdoğan go 
back years, and the current formation of 
the new parties is closely linked to this 
crisis. Thus, the fate of both parties will 
be determined more by the performance 
of Erdoğan than by their own actions. 
Political Baggage of the Leaders 
As senior members of past AKP govern-
ments, both leaders’ records will have 
an impact on their future. Compared to 
Davutoğlu, Babacan has two considerable 
advantages. Davutoğlu was the mastermind 
of Turkey’s increased involvement in the 
Middle East. Thus, he is largely associated 
with the ill-planned Syrian quagmire – 3.6 
million Syrian refugees in Turkey is a daily 
reminder of that failed policy. The issue is 
becoming a major source of public discon-
tent, as shown in the AKP’s electoral defeat 
in last year’s municipal elections. 
In contrast, Babacan is remembered as 
the steward of a successful economic pro-
gram, a legacy that becomes ever more pre-
cious in the current economic crisis, which 
he argues is due to deviation from his poli-
cies. Among the array of opposition politi-
cians, Babacan has the most credibility 
regarding governance issues. 
Babacan’s second advantage over Davu-
toğlu is his popularity among Kurdish 
voters. The AKP’s slide into ethnic Turkish 
nationalism and the adaptation of a secu-
rity-oriented paradigm toward the Kurdish 
 SWP Comment 22 
 May 2020 
 3 
question started during Davutoğlu’s term 
as PM. Davutoğlu is also associated with 
the cycle of violence and state repression in 
Kurdish cities that followed the AKP’s elec-
toral defeat on June 7, 2015. In contrast, 
Babacan was sidelined during that process 
and might therefore still appeal to Kurdish 
voters. In fact, discontented Kurdish voters 
of the AKP are expected to constitute the 
largest voting bloc and the backbone of 
DEVA during this phase. 
Ideologue vs. Technocrat 
Other factors distinguishing Babacan and 
Davutoğlu are their style of politics and 
their ideological leanings. Davutoğlu, a 
former academic, is more ideologically 
oriented than Babacan. In Davutoğlu’s 
worldview, Islam and conservative values 
constitute the core values. In contrast, 
Babacan, though he personally follows a 
conservative lifestyle, has a less ideological 
approach to politics. He has a technocratic 
touch and emphasizes his expertise on 
economy management as being his greatest 
asset as a politician. Babacan tries to con-
nect with voters by focusing on the rule of 
law, good governance, and bread and butter 
issues. 
These different attitudes also shape their 
criticisms of the AKP. Whereas Babacan 
criticizes the authoritarian, conspiratorial, 
and anti-Western turn that the AKP has 
taken, Davutoğlu makes a moral critique 
and focuses on individual corruption and 
increased nepotism. In a direct extension, 
Davutoğlu’s criticism of the AKP and Erdo-
ğan is more personal. He openly criticizes 
Erdoğan and his immediate family, where-
as Babacan shies away from such direct 
critiques, aiming to avoid the wrath of the 
government. Arguably, Davutoğlu’s per-
sonal criticisms irritate Erdoğan and have 
prompt him to take punitive measures 
against Davutoğlu and his movement. The 
most striking example was the confiscation 
of the Foundation of Sciences and Arts and 
the Şehir University of Istanbul, lifetime 
achievement of Davutoğlu. These actions, 
in turn, increase Davutoğlu’s visibility and 
stature. 
Babacan’s emphasis on technocratic 
expertise is also visible on the list of the 
party’s founders. There are several key 
bureaucrats, such as İbrahim Çanakcı, 
former Undersecretary of Treasury, and 
Birol Aydemir, former Head of the Turkish 
Statistical Institute. However, DEVA fell 
short of drawing political heavyweights. 
Even among former AKP dissidents, the 
party includes only a handful, and not the 
most important ones. Whereas Babacan 
aims to present himself as a team player, 
Davutoğlu’s style of politics is at the other 
end of the spectrum. Throughout his term 
as the MFA and PM, Davutoğlu performed 
a one man show, as no one else was signifi-
cantly visible. As a prominent academic 
with a clear-cut worldview, Davutoğlu is 
known to be an overconfident person who 
does not listen to advice or different view-
points, as he rarely doubts his own wisdom. 
Throughout his tenure as the MFA, he 
worked with a smaller than usual team 
of advisors, often former students of his. 
Given all these features, one can say that 
Davutoğlu’s style of politics greatly resem-
bles Erdoğan’s. He is self-centered, plays 
on conservative values and identity-based 
issues, and his style is confrontational and 
at times polarizing. In contrast, Babacan 
presents himself as an antidote to Erdoğan 
and the confrontational style of politics that 
has become his trademark. Thus, Babacan 
can appeal to the segments of society that 
are wary of Erdoğan’s fervent and polariz-
ing politics. However, this also implies that 
Babacan would not have the rousing, elec-
trifying effect on the masses that Erdoğan 
has – and to an extent Davutoğlu. With his 
non-confrontational style and his decision 
to avoid the cultural polarizations that 
dominate political life, Babacan will have 
difficulty mobilizing people. This is already 
evident, as Davutoğlu was able to form his 
party earlier and, so far, has managed to 
create an impression of a better organized 
and more energized movement. 
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Impact of the Presidential System 
If the ideological clarity of Davutoğlu has 
given him a head start compared to Baba-
can, the new presidential system strength-
ens the hand of Babacan. Its logic pushes 
political parties to form alliances. The more 
ideological outlook of Davutoğlu might 
create an impediment for the GP in forming 
alliances with the secular parties. In con-
trast, DEVA is more centrist, thus more 
prone to form alliances. Here, DEVA seems 
to have made a conscious decision to not 
limit its voter base to AKP voters. Although 
both parties – along with other opposition 
parties – are arguing for a return to the 
parliamentary system, they initially need to 
win in the presidential system. Defeating 
Erdoğan would require a combination of 
opposition votes and split votes that Baba-
can can take from the AKP. Thus, even 
though he does not rank among the most 
popular politicians in the country, in a two-
person race with Erdoğan, Babacan’s poten-
tial is higher than most opposition figures. 
Still, this requires that Ali Babacan – or 
the presidential candidate supported by 
DEVA – reach the second round. This 
would be impossible by solely relying on 
segments of the AKP base, and DEVA must 
also simultaneously appeal to the opposi-
tion bloc. Given that the CHP has a solid 
voter constituency of roughly 25 percent, 
DEVA either needs to attract voters from 
that base or manage to create an alliance 
or some sort of deal with the CHP. In either 
case, this demands ideological flexibility. 
The party is clearly formed to meet that 
flexibility. Yet, it is walking a tightrope, as 
DEVA needs to find a balance that would 
make it attractive to both the AKP and 
the opposition bloc. This difficulty forces 
Babacan to focus on the economy and good 
governance and avoid divisive identity 
politics. He is presenting himself and his 
party as the new political center, and DEVA 
is aiming to be a catch-all party, integrating 
actors from different ideological leanings. 
This was realized in the 1980s by the 
Motherland Party (ANAP) of Turgut Özal as 
well as in the 2000s by the AKP. 
Conclusions and Challenges Ahead 
Of the two challengers, Babacan has greater 
potential in the long run. Rather than di-
rectly confronting Erdoğan and trying to 
undermine him, Babacan will wait for Erdo-
ğan to undermine and discredit himself 
leading up to the next presidential elec-
tions, scheduled for 2023. By avoiding 
confrontations and portraying himself as 
the political center, he aims to emerge as a 
consensus name in a post-Erdoğan Turkey. 
Moreover, the impact of the coronavirus 
crisis could mean that he may not need to 
wait too long, as the current crisis is push-
ing the already dire economy to its limits. 
Although Erdoğan seems to have received 
an initial boost of support following the 
outbreak of the disease, this is more of a 
global pattern and it is uncertain as to how 
long this will last. 
If Babacan overcomes his short-term 
challenges in mobilizing people without 
resorting to cultural polarizations, he could 
be an important player in a post-Erdoğan 
Turkey. This is good news for Europe. Baba-
can’s emphasis on teamwork and institu-
tions will bring stability to the rollercoaster 
style in current Turkish foreign policy. 
Moreover, whereas Davutoğlu’s foreign 
policy line would likely follow Erdoğan’s 
anti-Western approach, a government that 
Babacan rules or has a significant role in 
will likely bring Turkey back to its more 
Western-oriented politics in the inter-
national arena, which would contribute 
to the restoration of the rule of law and 
human rights at home. 
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